The FIFA Ethical Recruitment Guide, including its Code of Conduct for Football Agents (Appendix 1), and the rules it summarises: the Football Agent Regulations (FFAR, January 2025 edition) and the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP, January 2027 edition) as regards minors. Its examples are useful above all for practical cases.
1. In the FIFA Ethical Recruitment Guide, where is the list whose points include “Reduce the incidence of abuse, exploitation and trafficking of young players” and “Enhance professional standards and credibility of FIFA-licensed football agents”?
Both quoted points belong to the list in section 1.1 of the Introduction (“Objectives of the FIFA ethical recruitment guide”, printed p. 5; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 443), which sets out the aims of the document: to understand the distinction between personal and professional ethics, increase understanding of ethical recruitment practice, improve transparency and compliance with FIFA regulations, identify and resolve professional ethical issues, reduce the incidence of abuse, exploitation and trafficking of young players, and enhance the professional standards and credibility of FIFA-licensed football agents. Section 2.4 of Unit 1 deals with the role of football agents in upholding ethical standards, not with the objectives of the Guide; Checklist 2 and the Code of Conduct in Appendix 1 do not contain this list.
2. During a training session, participants are asked how the FIFA Ethical Recruitment Guide was developed. According to its section 1.2 (“Guide Design and Methodology”), which three core sources did it draw on?
Section 1.2 (printed p. 5; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 443) explains that the Guide drew on three core sources: a review of the available literature, a survey distributed to, and completed by, a sample of football agents, and focus group sessions conducted with members of the FIFA Football Agent Working Group (FAWG). The FIFPRO survey cited later in Unit 1 (p. 450) is background data, not one of the sources of the methodology.
3. A club asks agent A to summarise the foundation of the FIFA Ethical Recruitment Guide. According to its section 1.2, on which principles and rights is the document based?
Section 1.2 (printed p. 5; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 443) states that the Guide “draws on the principles and rights enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and the International Safeguards for Children in Sport”. None of the texts cited in the other options appears in that section as a basis of the Guide.
4. In the FIFA Ethical Recruitment Guide, the term “minors” is defined in a footnote in Unit 1. What is that definition?
Footnote 1 of Unit 1 (printed p. 7; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 445) states that “Minors refer to children under the age of eighteen” and refers to Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), which defines a child as “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”. The footnote does not refer to the age of the first professional contract, and the age of 21 in the RSTP only concerns the maximum duration of trials (RSTP, January 2027 edition, art. 19ter, para. 4, p. 48).
5. Agent A firmly believes that she should keep certain client information confidential; however, in the interest of transparency she might be required to disclose some details to a third party. How does the Guide approach this situation?
Section 2.2 of Unit 1 (printed p. 8; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 446) gives this very example: a football agent may personally believe in keeping certain client information confidential, whereas professional ethics may require them to disclose certain details to a third party “to ensure transparency”. It concludes that “Balancing personal beliefs with professional obligations is key to ethical decision-making in football recruitment.” It is neither a conflict of interest (which sets the agent’s interests against the client’s) nor an automatic breach.
6. In the Guide’s outline of personal ethics (beliefs, values and attitudes), what is meant by “attitudes”?
According to section 2.2 of Unit 1 (printed p. 8; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 446), attitudes are “mental dispositions you hold toward others or situations, shaped by your values and beliefs”, and they influence how you behave in a given situation. The “ideas you hold to be true” are beliefs, the “long-standing beliefs about what is important to you” are values, and the standards expected in a specific professional context refer to professional ethics.
7. According to the Guide, all professional codes of conduct are underpinned by a series of ethical principles that are crucial in football recruitment. Which combination appears entirely in that list?
At the end of section 2.2 of Unit 1 (printed p. 9; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 447), the Guide states that “All professional codes of conduct are underpinned by ethical principles, including” honesty and integrity; trustworthiness and loyalty; doing good and avoiding harm; respect for others; compliance with the law; and accountability and transparency. The other options mix one principle from the list with others that do not appear in it (commercial discretion, obedience to the club, client exclusivity, political neutrality, confidentiality without exceptions).
8. According to the survey of football agents on which the Guide relies, what proportion of respondents viewed ensuring full transparency with the player and their family as a vital component of ethical recruitment?
Section 2.3 of Unit 1 (‘Transparency’ box, printed p. 9; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 447) states that “98% of surveyed football agents viewed ensuring full transparency with the player and their family as a vital component of ethical recruitment.” The other figures appear in other passages: 82.5% (bribery and corruption prevalent, p. 451), 88.6% (effect on players’ mental health, p. 455) and 65.9% (would also report to national football associations and law enforcement, p. 465).
9. Agent A spends several hours every month studying the FFAR, the RSTP and the labour and child protection laws of the countries in which he works. Which of the three key ethical responsibilities highlighted by the Guide is he exercising?
The ‘Key ethical responsibilities for football agents’ box (Unit 1, section 2.4, printed p. 11; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 449) distinguishes competence (being knowledgeable about the legal and regulatory framework of football, so that actions align with FIFA standards and local laws), integrity (transparency and honesty in all dealings with players and clubs) and diligence (continuously working in the best interests of clients). Fairness appears elsewhere in Unit 1 (‘Fairness and Integrity’ box, p. 448) as a feature of ethical recruitment, not as one of those three responsibilities.
10. Agent A assures the parents of a young player that, thanks to his friendship with club B’s sporting director, their son “has a place guaranteed” if they sign with him. How does this conduct fit within the Guide?
Section 2.5 of Unit 1 (printed p. 11; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 449) lists among improper conduct the attempt to “state or imply the ability to influence improperly any stakeholder in the football ecosystem”, alongside dishonesty, fraud and misrepresentation. In addition, paragraph 3.3 of the Code of Conduct (Appendix 1, p. 494) provides that the football agent “shall not provide materially false or misleading information”. Holding a licence does not make the promise lawful.
11. The Guide cites a 2023 FIFPRO survey of 263 professional players from seven African countries. What proportion of them had been contacted by a person claiming to be a football agent who said they could help them move club?
According to section 2.5 of Unit 1 (printed p. 12; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 450), more than 70% of the players surveyed by FIFPRO had been contacted by a person claiming to be a football agent. The other figures come from the same survey but measure something else: 43% of the players approached were offered a trial, 36% were approached via social media, and 27% reported a bad experience with the person.
12. An intermediary charges a young player’s family USD 3,000 to “cover the visa and the trial” at a foreign club. The trial is never organised and the boy is left alone in the country of destination. How does the Guide classify this practice?
The ‘Misrepresentation and fraud’ box (Unit 1, section 2.5, printed p. 12; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 450) describes how unscrupulous football agents might “charge substantial fees, claiming they cover trial costs, visa applications, or relocation expenses”; when the promised trials or contracts do not materialise, players are sometimes left in foreign countries without support, and “It is viewed as a form of human trafficking.” In addition, art. 19ter, para. 6 RSTP (January 2027 edition, p. 48) prohibits any person subject to the FIFA Statutes from requesting, offering or receiving any payment connected to a trial, without prejudice to the conditions agreed between the club and the triallist; a receipt does not legitimise it.
13. Agent A, who holds a valid licence, gives the parents of a 13-year-old player a mobile phone and promises them a monthly allowance if they grant him the future exclusive representation of the boy. Which statement is correct?
The Guide describes this conduct as the poaching of young talent through financial inducements offered to families to secure the exclusive right to represent the player (Unit 1, section 2.5, printed p. 13; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 451). Paragraph 4.2 of the Code of Conduct (Appendix 1, p. 494) prohibits offering financial inducements, gifts or material goods to minors or their families as a condition for signing a representation agreement, and art. 16, para. 3 b) ii) FFAR (January 2025 edition, p. 284) prohibits offering any undue personal, pecuniary or other advantage to an Individual’s family member or legal guardian in relation to a Representation Agreement. Moreover, a minor may not be approached earlier than six months before the age at which they may sign their first professional contract, and only with the prior written consent of the legal guardian (art. 13, para. 1, p. 278).
14. An agent secretly pays an official so that a young foreign player can cross the border and be registered without the required documentation. According to the Guide, into which category of improper conduct does this fall?
The ‘Bribery and corruption’ box (Unit 1, section 2.5, printed p. 13; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 451) states that “Bribery extends beyond player placement” and that this “includes the use of illicit payments to bypass immigration laws”, which facilitates the movement of minors across borders without proper documentation or the necessary safeguards. Poaching refers to financial inducements offered to families to secure the representation of the player.
15. Agent A pressures his 19-year-old client to sign for club B, which offers the agent a high commission, although club C guarantees the player more playing time and better development. What does the Guide describe in an almost identical example?
The ‘Conflict of interest’ box (Unit 1, section 2.5, printed p. 13; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 451) gives the example of an agent who might “pressure a young player to sign with a lesser club that offers a high commission rather than a better development opportunity elsewhere”. The FFAR requires a Football Agent to always act in the best interests of their Client(s) and to avoid conflicts of interest (art. 16, para. 2 a) and c), January 2025 edition, p. 282). The case does not involve a transfer routed through an intermediary club.
16. A contract gives agent A’s agency a percentage of all the player’s future earnings throughout his career, with heavy penalties if he wishes to leave. How does the Guide classify it?
The ‘Financial exploitation and breach of contract’ box (Unit 1, section 2.5, printed p. 14; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 452) notes that unfair contracts with high commission rates or rigid clauses leave players “financially bound to football agents, sometimes for years”, and that when football agents “secure a percentage of a player’s future earnings” they create “a long-term financial dependency”. The other options describe other conduct listed in the same section.
17. According to the Guide, who are mainly behind the trafficking of young players lured with false promises of trials or places in academies abroad?
The ‘Human trafficking and exploitation of minors’ box (Unit 1, section 2.5, printed p. 14; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 452) states that this conduct is carried out by “primarily unlicensed football agents or those purporting to be football agents”. The Guide adds that there are also instances of domestic sport trafficking, through unregistered football academies. The other options attribute trafficking to regulated actors whom the Guide does not identify as the main perpetrators.
18. In country X, a private “academy” with no link to any club charges high fees to low-income families, promising trials in Europe. According to the RSTP (January 2027 edition), which the Guide summarises, what obligation exists regarding the minors who attend it?
The Guide warns about ‘football academies’ used as a front by unlicensed football agents (Unit 1, section 2.5, printed p. 15; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 453) and summarises art. 19bis RSTP (Unit 2, p. 464). Under art. 19bis, para. 2 RSTP (January 2027 edition, p. 46), each association “shall request all academies without legal, financial or de facto links to a club (private academies) operating on its territory to report all minors who attend the academy to the association” and must report any wrongdoing to the relevant authorities. Art. 19bis provides neither for a FIFA academy licence nor for prior authorisation by the Players’ Status Chamber.
19. Among the fraudulent practices described by the Guide are so-called “one-two pass contracts”. What do they consist of?
According to the ‘Ghost players and “One-two pass contracts”’ box (Unit 1, section 2.5, printed p. 16; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 454), “‘One-two pass contracts’ involve temporarily moving players from one club to another in a pre-arranged deal to evade regulations or financial scrutiny.” Including a non-existent player in a squad list describes ‘ghost players’; inflating the value of a transfer corresponds to the overvaluation of transfer fees and ‘bungs’; and grouping several players under a single structure with favouritism is the use of talent pools.
20. A club’s sponsor secretly pays EUR 20,000 to agent A so that she steers her client, a player, towards that club. According to the Guide, how should this payment be assessed?
The ‘Undisclosed payments to football agents’ box (Unit 1, section 2.5, printed p. 16; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 454) expressly includes sponsors among the football stakeholders that sometimes make undisclosed payments to football agents to influence decisions such as player transfers or contracts, and states: “Such payments are illegal under FIFA regulations, and football agents found accepting or arranging them face sanctions.” The Code of Conduct (Appendix 1, para. 6.3, p. 495) also provides that the football agent “shall not solicit, accept, or offer any unauthorised payments, gifts, or commissions from clubs, players, coaches, sponsors, or other third parties”. Declaring the payment afterwards does not make it lawful, and the Guide does not provide for the nullity of the player’s employment contract.
21. According to Unit 1 of the Guide, what consequences can the agent personally suffer if he or she resorts to unethical recruitment practices?
The ‘Damage to reputation and career’ box (Unit 1, printed p. 19; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 457) states that engaging in unethical recruitment practices “can lead to severe reputational damage, loss of licensure, and legal consequences”, and may make it difficult for an agent to attract future clients. The other consequences listed in Unit 1 fall on others: demotivation and depression on players; debt and the sale of valuable assets on families and players (p. 455); and guilt and resentment on families (p. 454). The Code of Conduct (Appendix 1, para. 10.2, p. 495) adds fines, suspension or withdrawal of the FIFA licence.
22. Agent A discovers that an intermediary has falsified a young player’s age in order to increase the value of his transfer. The player is not her client. According to the Guide and the FFAR, what should she do?
Falsifying player ages to increase transfer values is listed among the unethical practices (Unit 1, printed p. 17; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 455). Art. 16, para. 2 i) FFAR (January 2025 edition, p. 282) requires a Football Agent to “immediately report any breaches of these Regulations, or FIFA, confederation or member association rules, regulations or codes of conduct to the relevant authority or body”, even where no client of theirs is involved, and Checklist 2 (p. 490) contains the commitment to report unethical practices to FIFA or its member association. The Guide (Unit 2, section 3.3, p. 465) adds that 65.9% of the agents surveyed would also report to national football associations and law enforcement in the case of illicit activities.
23. A candidate is looking in the Guide for the passage that lists, among other examples, money laundering, match manipulation, payments into unnamed bank accounts and “ghost players”. Where should they look?
These examples are in section 2.5 of Unit 1, “Improper and Criminal Conduct (Unethical Practices in Football Recruitment)” (starting at printed p. 11; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 449), in the ‘Other examples of improper and criminal conduct’ box (printed pp. 15-16; pp. 453-454). Paragraph 6 of the Code of Conduct (Appendix 1, p. 495) prohibits misappropriation of funds, fraud, bribery and unauthorised payments, but does not list those examples; section 3.3 of Unit 2 (p. 465) deals with compliance with the FFAR and reporting, and section 3.1 (p. 459) with the FFAR articles.
24. In which part of the Guide are gender equality in recruitment, socio-economic barriers and biases such as the halo effect or confirmation bias addressed?
Section 4.2 of Unit 3, “Fairness and Non-Discrimination” (printed pp. 36-37; Study Materials (January 2026), pp. 474-475), covers gender equality, equal opportunities despite socio-economic barriers, and biases (unconscious bias, affinity bias, stereotyping bias, gender bias, confirmation bias, the Halo/Horns effect and affect heuristics). Section 5.3 of Unit 4 deals with contracts (p. 480), section 3.3 of Unit 2 with compliance with the FFAR (p. 465), and section 3.1 with its articles (p. 459).
25. The Guide presents one FFAR article as bridging the gap between FIFA’s regulations and national laws, because it requires member associations to adopt national regulations for Representation Agreements without an international dimension. Which article is it?
The Guide (Unit 2, section 3.1, printed p. 21; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 459) presents art. 3 FFAR, “National football agent regulations”, as playing “a pivotal role in bridging the gap between FIFA’s regulations and national laws”. Under paras. 1 and 2 (FFAR, January 2025 edition, p. 270), member associations must implement national football agent regulations that apply to all Representation Agreements that do not have an international dimension and that incorporate articles 11 to 21 by reference. Art. 2, para. 3 only indicates which national regulations apply, without imposing that obligation; arts. 12 and 13 govern representation and the representation of minors. Art. 3, para. 2 c) and d) are suspended by circular no. 1873.
26. On the same day, agent A signs two three-year Representation Agreements: one with a 22-year-old player and one with club B as Engaging Entity. According to the FFAR, to which the Guide refers, what is the position on those durations?
Art. 12, para. 3 FFAR (January 2025 edition; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 276) limits Representation Agreements between an Individual and a Football Agent to two years, extendable only by a new Representation Agreement (any automatic renewal provision is null and void), whereas para. 5 provides that an agreement concluded with an Engaging Entity or Releasing Entity “is not subject to a maximum duration”. The Guide recalls the two-year limit in Unit 2 (p. 460) and in Unit 4 (p. 480); it does not apply only to minors.
27. A player born on 10/03/2011 will work in a country where the minimum age for signing a first professional contract is 16. From what date, at the earliest, may agent A approach him with a view to representing him?
Under art. 13, para. 1 FFAR (January 2025 edition; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 278), which the Guide summarises in Unit 2 (p. 460), an Approach may be made no more than six months before the minor reaches the age at which they may sign their first professional contract under the law applicable where the minor will be employed. The player turns 16 on 10/03/2027; six months earlier is 10/09/2026. 10/03/2027 is the date from which he could already sign his first professional contract, not the start of the period for approaching him; in addition, the Approach may only be made once prior written consent has been obtained from the minor’s legal guardian.
28. Agent A, who has already completed the designated CPD course on minors, contacts a young player via social media without informing his parents. The player is within six months of reaching the age at which he may sign his first professional contract. Which FFAR provision does A breach?
Art. 13, para. 1 FFAR (January 2025 edition; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 278) provides that an Approach to a minor or their legal guardian may only be made once prior written consent has been obtained from the minor’s legal guardian, in addition to respecting the six-month limit. The Guide stresses this obligation and the role of parents and guardians (Unit 2, p. 460). A violation of para. 1 is sanctioned, at a minimum, with a fine and a suspension of a Football Agent licence of up to two years (art. 13, para. 4, p. 278); the course required by para. 2 had already been completed.
29. Agent B only represents clubs. Club C instructs him to negotiate the signing of a 17-year-old player. Must he have completed the CPD course on the representation of minors?
Art. 13, para. 2 FFAR (January 2025 edition; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 278) requires a Football Agent that wishes to “represent a minor or represent a club in a Transaction involving a minor” to first successfully complete the designated CPD course on minors. It is therefore not enough that he does not represent the player directly. The Guide recalls this requirement in Unit 2 (pp. 460 and 465).
30. Agent A, who meets all the requirements to represent minors, negotiates the first professional contract of a 17-year-old player under the law of the country of his new club. May she receive a service fee for this service?
Art. 14, para. 9 FFAR (January 2025 edition; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 280), which the Guide cites in Unit 2 (p. 461), provides that a Football Agent may not receive a service fee when engaged to perform Football Agent Services relating to a minor “unless the relevant player is signing their first or subsequent professional contract” in accordance with the law applicable where the minor will be employed. The Guide adds that service fees must be limited to fair compensation for genuine services.
31. Which FFAR provision does the Guide cite to recall that the agent must always act in the best interests of their Clients, which is especially relevant with minors?
The Guide (Unit 2, section 3.1, ‘Art. 16 | Rights and obligations’, printed p. 24; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 462) cites art. 16, para. 2 a) FFAR, which requires a Football Agent to “always act in the best interests of their Client(s)” (FFAR, January 2025 edition, p. 282). Art. 12, para. 7 a) requires the names of the parties in the Representation Agreement; art. 13, para. 3 a) refers to those minimum requirements for agreements with minors; and art. 11, para. 4 a) prevents Clients from having an Interest in the affairs of a Football Agent.
32. Player P joins club B thanks to the negotiation conducted by agent A. According to the FFAR, to which the Guide refers, what details about the agent must appear in the resulting employment contract?
Art. 12, para. 11 FFAR (January 2025 edition; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 277) provides that any relevant transfer or employment agreement concluded following the provision of Football Agent Services shall specify the Football Agent’s name, their Client, their FIFA licence number and their signature; art. 16, para. 2 d) (p. 282) requires the agent to ensure that these details appear. The Guide presents this transparency requirement in Unit 2 (p. 462). Stating only the name and the fee would omit the licence number and the signature.
33. Agent A pays for a holiday for the head coach of club B so that he regularly fields A’s client. Which FFAR provision, which the Guide illustrates with an analogous example, does he breach?
According to the Guide (Unit 2, section 3.1, printed p. 24; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 462), art. 16, para. 3(b) FFAR prohibits football agents from offering or paying any undue personal, pecuniary or other advantage to any official or employee of a club, member association or Single-Entity League, which includes “any attempt to influence a coach to select a certain player”. The prohibition is in art. 16, para. 3 b) i. FFAR (January 2025 edition; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 284). Art. 14, para. 5 concerns the agent’s service fee, not advantages offered to third parties.
34. A player has an exclusive Representation Agreement with agent A whose last day of validity is 30/06/2027. From what date may agent B approach him or sign a Representation Agreement with him?
The Guide (Unit 4, ‘Exclusivity Clauses’, printed p. 44; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 482) recalls that, under FIFA’s Regulations, “a football agent may not approach a player subject to an exclusive representation agreement with another football agent, except in the final two months of that exclusive representation agreement”. This is laid down in art. 16, para. 1 b) (Approach) and c) (execution of a Representation Agreement) FFAR (January 2025 edition; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 282). An agreement whose last day is 30/06/2027 is in its final two months from 01/05/2027 (May and June); 01/06/2027 would leave only one month, while 01/01/2027 (six months) and 01/04/2027 (three months) are too early.
35. A club signs an agreement with an investment fund that allows the fund to influence its transfer policy. Under art. 18bis RSTP, as presented by the Guide, which body may impose sanctions on the club?
The Guide (Unit 2, section 3.2, printed p. 24; Study Materials (January 2026), p. 462) states that breaching art. 18bis “can result in disciplinary measures by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee”. Art. 18bis, para. 2 RSTP (January 2027 edition, p. 38) keeps that competence: “The FIFA Disciplinary Committee may impose disciplinary measures on clubs that do not observe the obligations set out in this article.” The Dispute Resolution Chamber settles contractual disputes; it does not sanction third-party influence.
FootballAgentPracticeExam · Topics · Exam guide · Sample questions