The FIFA Code of Ethics, 2023 edition: whom it applies to (football agents included), sanctions and recidivism, limitation periods, general duties and rules of conduct (conflicts of interest, gifts, commissions, betting, bribery, manipulation) and the competence of the Ethics Committee.
1. Which provision of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition) expressly includes football agents among the persons to whom it applies?
Under art. 2, para. 1 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 121), the Code applies to all officials and players as well as match agents licensed by FIFA and football agents, under the conditions of art. 1. Article 1 defines which conduct is covered, not whom it binds, and art. 31 sets out the competence of the Ethics Committee, not the circle of persons bound.
2. Football agent A argues that the Code of Ethics does not apply to him because the Code’s own definition of “official” excludes football agents. Which statement is correct?
Definition no. 2 of “official” in the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 118) does exclude players, match agents licensed by FIFA and football agents, but art. 2, para. 1 (p. 121) makes football agents subject to the Code as a category in their own right. The exclusion only means that they are not treated as officials; no additional office is required, and the Code is not limited to FIFA events.
3. In 2024, football agent B engaged in conduct allegedly contrary to the Code of Ethics. In 2026 she stops practising and does not renew her licence; months later proceedings are opened. Can the Ethics Committee judge her?
Art. 2, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 121) entitles the Ethics Committee to investigate and judge the conduct of persons who were bound by the Code at the time the conduct occurred, regardless of whether they remain bound when proceedings commence. The 90-day period belongs to art. 31, para. 2 and concerns the inaction of a confederation or member association, not an authorisation.
4. Conduct committed in 2021 is judged today under the 2023 Code, which provides a higher maximum sanction for it than the Code in force in 2021. Under art. 3, which rule applies?
Art. 3 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 121) applies the Code to conduct whenever it occurred, but allows a sanction only if the conduct contravened the Code applicable at the time it occurred, and the sanction may not exceed the maximum available under that Code. There is no retroactive application of the heavier sanction and no automatic reduction by half.
5. According to art. 1, para. 1 of the Code of Ethics, which conduct falls within its material scope of application?
Art. 1, para. 1 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 121) applies to conduct that damages the integrity and reputation of football, other than conduct specifically provided for by other regulations and connected to the field of play. What happens on the field of play is a matter for the FIFA Disciplinary Code, and the personal scope (art. 2) goes far beyond the Council and the standing committees.
6. Which part of the Code of Ethics must confederations and member associations include in their own regulations, unless they already contain equivalent rules?
Art. 1, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 121) requires confederations and member associations to include the rules of conduct of Part II, section 5 (arts. 14 to 30) in their regulations, and the principles of the sanctioning system serve as minimum requirement guidance. That obligation does not extend to the procedural rules, the limitation period or the final provisions.
7. Official C shares a home with a friend who is neither a relative nor a romantic partner. For the purposes of the Code of Ethics, how is that friend classified?
Definition no. 6(c) of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 118) treats as a related party an “individual sharing the same household, regardless of the personal relationship”. Being a representative or employee (a) or controlling an entity (e) are alternative, not cumulative, criteria: it is enough to meet one of them.
8. Football agent D regularly provides services on behalf of company S, although he has never signed a formal contract with it. Is S a related party of agent D under the Code of Ethics?
Definition no. 6(e)(iv) of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 118) includes among related parties an entity if the person “performs services on behalf of such entity, partnership or fiduciary institution, regardless of the existence of a formal contract”. Holding a management position in the entity or controlling it are different grounds (sub-paras. i and ii), and the entity’s domicile is not a criterion.
9. If there are omissions in the procedural rules or doubts about the interpretation of the Code of Ethics, on what basis does the Ethics Committee decide under art. 4?
Art. 4, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 121) provides that, in the event of omissions regarding procedural rules or doubts about the interpretation of the Code, the Ethics Committee decides in accordance with FIFA custom. Para. 3 also allows it to draw on precedents and principles established by sports doctrine and jurisprudence, but the Code refers neither to Swiss law nor to the national law of the accused.
10. Which of the following measures appears in the list of sanctions in art. 7, para. 1 of the Code of Ethics?
Art. 7, para. 1(f) of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 124) includes “community football service” among the ten possible sanctions (from a warning to a ban on taking part in any football-related activity). Deduction of points, a transfer ban and relegation are Disciplinary Code measures aimed at clubs and associations, and are not on that list.
11. Football agent E helped an official to try to conceal an undue benefit, but the attempt failed before producing any effect. Can E be sanctioned under the Code of Ethics?
Art. 6, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 124) subjects breaches to sanction whether they are acts of commission or omissions, whether committed deliberately or negligently, whether or not the breach constitutes an act or attempted act, and whether the parties acted as principal, accomplice or instigator. Neither the lack of completion nor the status of accomplice rules out a sanction.
12. Football agent F has been sanctioned with a ban on taking part in any football-related activity and asks for the sanction to be suspended. What does art. 8 of the Code of Ethics provide?
Art. 8, para. 1 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 124) allows the adjudicatory chamber, upon request from the relevant party, to suspend precisely the sanction in art. 7, para. 1(j) (ban on taking part in any football-related activity), with a probationary period of one to five years. It is for neither the investigatory chamber nor the Appeal Committee to do so.
13. The sanction imposed on football agent G was suspended, subject to a probationary period. Before it ends, G commits a new breach of the Code. What happens to the suspended sanction?
Under art. 8, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 124), if the person commits any other breach during the probationary period, the suspension is automatically revoked and the original sanction is fully applied and added to the sanction imposed for the new breach, so both apply. No new decision is needed, and there is no absorption.
14. The breach committed by football agent H carries a minimum fine of CHF 10,000, but there are clear mitigating circumstances. What does art. 9 of the Code of Ethics allow?
Art. 9, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 125) allows the Ethics Committee, in case of mitigating circumstances and if deemed appropriate, to go below the minimum sanction and/or to hand down alternative sanctions as provided under art. 7, para. 1. Returning the advantage received (para. 1) is only one factor that may reduce the sanction, not a condition for going below the minimum.
15. In the same proceedings, football agent I is found to have committed two distinct breaches of the Code. Under art. 10, how is the non-monetary sanction determined?
Art. 10 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 125) provides that, where more than one breach has been committed, the sanction other than monetary sanctions is based on the most serious breach, and concurrent breaches are considered aggravating circumstances. Non-monetary sanctions are neither added together nor averaged.
16. Under art. 12 of the Code of Ethics, recidivism occurs if another offence of a similar nature and gravity is committed within which period?
Art. 12, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 126) requires the new offence, of a similar nature and gravity, to be committed within 15 years of notification of a decision sanctioning a previous offence. The starting point is the notification of the decision, not the date of the first offence; recidivism is an aggravating circumstance that allows the maximum sanction to be exceeded (para. 1).
17. Football agent J accepted an undue gift on 5 January 2014 and the decision sanctioning him was notified to him on 10 March 2015. On 1 February 2030 he accepts another undue gift of a similar nature and gravity. Under art. 12, is this recidivism?
Art. 12, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 126) counts 15 years from notification of the previous decision: 10 March 2015 + 15 years = 10 March 2030, and the new offence (1 February 2030) falls before that date, so there is recidivism. Counting from the 2014 offence (expiry on 5 January 2029) is the typical error; the limitation period of the first offence is irrelevant, because it was already sanctioned.
18. Football agent K repeatedly committed breaches of a similar nature and gravity in 2017, 2019 and 2022, with no intervening decision. From when does the limitation period run for all those breaches together?
In the case of repeated breaches, art. 11, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 125) provides that the limitation period applies only as from the date the most recent offence was committed and therefore applies to all previous breaches; art. 13, para. 6 (p. 126) confirms that the period starts only after the last of the repeated breaches has ended. The 2017 breach is therefore not judged in isolation.
19. Football agent M is investigated for having offered an official an undue advantage in 2019 to close a deal (bribery, art. 28). Unless extended or interrupted, for how long can the offence be prosecuted?
Art. 13, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 126) provides that offences relating to bribery and corruption (art. 28) and to misappropriation and misuse of funds (art. 29) may no longer be prosecuted after ten years have elapsed, as against the general five-year rule in para. 1. Only the conduct under art. 24 referred to in para. 3 is not subject to a limitation period.
20. In 2026 it is reported that in 2012 coach O, an official of a club, threatened and coerced a minor female player into providing sexual favours. Does the limitation period in art. 13 prevent proceedings from being opened today?
Art. 13, para. 3 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 126) excludes from the limitation period offences relating to threats, the promise of advantages, coercion and all forms of sexual abuse, harassment and exploitation (art. 24, p. 131). The ten-year period in para. 2 is limited to bribery, corruption, misappropriation and misuse of funds.
21. Football agent P accepted an undue gift (art. 21) on 1 March 2022. A formal investigation was opened on 15 January 2027 and there are no criminal proceedings. Applying art. 13, until what date can the breach be prosecuted?
The general period is five years (art. 13, para. 1 of the FIFA Code of Ethics, 2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 126), so it would expire on 1 March 2027. As the formal investigation was opened before then (15 January 2027), para. 4 extends it by half its length: 5 + 2.5 = 7.5 years from the facts, i.e. until 1 September 2029. The extension is added to the period, not counted from the opening of the investigation (that would give 15 July 2029).
22. Official Q committed an act of corruption (art. 28) on 10 May 2018. On 20 February 2026, before the limitation period expired, a formal investigation was opened. Until what date can the breach be prosecuted?
Corruption is time-barred after ten years (art. 13, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics, 2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 126), so the period would expire on 10 May 2028. As the formal investigation was opened before that date, para. 4 extends the period by half its length: 10 + 5 = 15 years from the facts, i.e. until 10 May 2033. Applying the extended general five-year period (7.5 years, i.e. 10 November 2025) confuses the corruption regime with the general one, and the extension is not counted from the opening of the investigation (20 February 2031).
23. Official R incurred a conflict of interest (art. 20) on 1 June 2020. The formal investigation is opened on 15 July 2025 and there were no criminal proceedings. Can the breach still be prosecuted?
A conflict of interest follows the general five-year rule of art. 13, para. 1 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 126): the period expired on 1 June 2025. The extension in para. 4 operates only if the formal investigation is opened “before its expiration”, and here it was opened on 15 July 2025, when the breach was already time-barred.
24. While the limitation period for a breach by football agent S is running, criminal proceedings are formally opened against him for the same facts. What effect does this have under art. 13, para. 5?
Art. 13, para. 5 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 126) provides that the limitation period is interrupted where criminal proceedings are formally opened against a person bound by the Code, during such proceedings. The Code provides neither for a doubling of the period nor for a loss of competence of the Ethics Committee.
25. Football agent T submitted a forged contract on 15 February 2020 (art. 25). No formal investigation or criminal proceedings were opened, and the facts are discovered in March 2026. Can they still be prosecuted?
Forgery (art. 25) is not among the exceptions in art. 13 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 126): the ten-year period of para. 2 is limited to arts. 28 and 29, and the absence of any limitation period in para. 3 to art. 24. The general five-year period from the facts therefore applies (15 February 2020 + 5 years = 15 February 2025), with no extension because no investigation was opened before that date.
26. What sanction does art. 14, para. 5 of the Code of Ethics provide for a breach of the general duties?
Art. 14, para. 5 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 127) punishes a breach of the general duties with a fine of at least CHF 10,000 and a ban on taking part in any football-related activity for a maximum of two years. The CHF 100,000 figures correspond to betting (art. 27) and to bribery or misappropriation (arts. 28-29); a minimum ban of two years applies to offences such as forgery (art. 25).
27. Football agent U dines alone with the referee appointed for a match of a club he advises, the evening before the game. No agreement between them is proved. Which general duty under art. 14 is affected?
Art. 14, para. 4 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 127) requires persons bound by the Code to refrain from any activity or behaviour that might give rise to “the appearance or suspicion of improper conduct”. No agreement need be proved: appearance is enough. Political neutrality, disclosure of income and confidentiality are separate duties (arts. 15, 19 and 17).
28. Art. 15 of the Code of Ethics sets out the duty of neutrality. What does it require of persons bound by the Code in their dealings with government institutions and other organisations?
Art. 15, para. 1 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 127) requires persons bound by the Code, in dealings with government institutions, national and international organisations, associations and groupings, to remain politically neutral and generally act in a manner compatible with their function and integrity. It does not require prior authorisation or reports on every meeting.
29. Sporting director V, an official of club W, knowingly signs an agreement that harms his club financially in order to favour a competitor. Which duty under the Code of Ethics does he mainly breach?
Art. 16, para. 1 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 127) establishes a fiduciary duty to FIFA, the confederations, associations, leagues or clubs, which is breached when someone placed in a position of responsibility or trust acts in a way that is detrimental to their interests. The duty to report (art. 18) and the duty to cooperate (art. 19) concern the relationship with the Ethics Committee.
30. Football agent X worked as an employee of a member association and learned confidential information there. Two years after leaving the post, she discloses it to win clients. What does art. 17 of the Code of Ethics provide?
Art. 17, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 127) provides that the obligation to respect confidentiality survives the termination of any relationship which makes a person subject to the Code. The Code sets no one-year limit, and the confidentiality binding the members of the Ethics Committee is a separate obligation (art. 37).
31. Football agent Y has direct knowledge that an official has forged a registration document. How must he proceed under art. 18 of the Code of Ethics?
Art. 18, para. 1 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 128) requires persons bound by the Code who become aware of any infringement to inform, in writing, the secretariat and/or chairperson of the investigatory chamber of the Ethics Committee directly. An oral report to the association is not enough, and the Code does not make the duty conditional on having documentary evidence. Failure to report is sanctioned (para. 2).
32. In an investigation in which he is only a witness, the Ethics Committee asks football agent Z for information about his income and financial transactions. Is he obliged to provide it?
Art. 19, para. 1 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 128) requires cooperation with the Ethics Committee at all times, whether involved as a party, as a witness or in any other role, and expressly includes the obligation to disclose details regarding income and finances if the Ethics Committee deems it to be necessary. There is no five-year limit and no court authorisation is required.
33. After scout AA testified as a witness before the Ethics Committee, football agent BB stops giving him assignments and publicly admits that he does so as punishment for that testimony. Which rule does BB breach?
Art. 19, para. 5 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 128) prohibits harassing, intimidating, threatening or retaliating against someone for any reason related to that person’s actual, potential or perceived assistance to or cooperation with the Ethics Committee. Withdrawing assignments as punishment for testifying is retaliation; arts. 17, 21 and 22 deal with different matters.
34. During the investigation, football agent CC, a party to the proceedings, replies to the requests of the Ethics Committee months late, despite a prior warning. What may the investigatory chamber do when preparing the final report?
Art. 41 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 139) allows the chairperson of the appropriate chamber, after warning them, to charge a party that fails to cooperate or is dilatory in responding with a violation of art. 19 (para. 1), and allows the investigatory chamber, in preparing a final report based on the file in its possession, to take that behaviour into account and add the failure to cooperate as an additional charge (para. 2).
35. Under art. 20, para. 2 of the Code of Ethics, when must relations and interests that could lead to a conflict of interest be disclosed?
Art. 20, para. 2 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2023 edition; Study Materials January 2026, p. 129) requires persons bound by the Code, before being elected, appointed or employed, to disclose any relations and interests that could lead to situations of conflicts of interest in the context of their prospective activities. The Code provides for neither a 30-day period nor an annual declaration.
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